

REFLECTIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE OUTLOOK

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1. *The principal obstacles to the achievement of the goals set:
lack of cooperation of the great powers*

At the birth of the United Nations there was unanimous agreement on the idea that the Security Council should be made supreme guard of the maintenance of collective security. Relying on the cooperation of the great powers firmly established during the War and on the cohesive force of the anti-Fascist coalition those launching the United Nations were looking forward with great expectations to the operation of the new institution.

It would, however, be wrong to regard the period of the formulation of the UN Charter and its approval as one of rose-coloured illusions, wholly free of conflicts. Responsible statesmen, before all the representatives of the Soviet Union, were fully aware of the latent controversies which had made their effects felt already during the War and which came to light ever more markedly in the period following upon the Yalta Conference. The principal source of the controversies was the parallel coexistence of a that time only socialist state and the capitalist world system. In addition at that time already the process set in of the disintegration of the colonial system and also the interests of the developed capitalist states began to run counter one another.

If this was the state of affairs, was the optimism permeating the UN Charter justified at all? Or, if the question is put in a cruder form, were the lofty ideas and provisions really meant to cover up the hypocrisy of the makers of the Charter?

In our opinion, the road outlined by the Charter for the progress of mankind will, if viewed in the light of the war-time coalition and cooperation and of the ideas of democracy matched against Fascism, appear to be a quite realistic one. At the same time in view of the controversies at that time already perceivable and of the dissenting opinions, guarantees before all the principle of the unanimity of the great powers, had to be taken up in the Charter which would come into action as soon as flaws would appear in the harmony as imagined.

As confirmed by historical development guarantees were in fact badly wanted, in particular with the advent of the period of the cold war.

It is beyond the scope of the present study to analyze and explore the long complexity-loaded historical period, in a somewhat slipshod manner and inaccurately called the period of the cold war, with any pretence to scholarliness. We cannot even set as a goal the particularly thorough study of the reflection of the cold war in the Security Council. However, relying on the well-known facts we may even so advance the statement that the first years of the cold war, and then later the Korean conflict grown to a veritable war, shattered the expectations which the governments and peoples of the United Nations, from the birth of the Moscow Declaration till the signature of the United Nations Charter in San Francisco, cherished for the creation of a system of collective security.

For the advent of the cold war the imperialist world system, above all the United States of America, is responsible. The policy purposing the prevention of the expansion of socialism made its *début*. Every possible means was used to roll back the progressive forces, to oust them from the governments, as in France and Italy, even such as were not short of open intervention (e. g. in Greece). This western policy of force with predilection banked on the atomic monopoly. By the side of Marxist criticism, western historians, among them Americans, recognize this. As a pioneer work that of Professor Fleming excels.¹ This author, otherwise not a Marxist one, demonstrates that the roots of the cold war go back to 1917, the October Revolution. He traces the whole path of western hostility and lack of understanding, in particular after the Second World War, back to this event. The liberal and leading generation of American historians of today, even if it does not adopt Fleming's school of thought stamped by it as "revisionist" wholesale, lay the blame equally on both parties, like e. g. Arthur Schlesinger,² this prominent theorist of the Kennedy era.

We cannot, however, be oblivious of the fact that in American public opinion it is still the dominant belief that the alleged aggressivity of Soviet foreign policy accounts for the change in American foreign policy.³

When for our part we lay the blame on the policy of western capitalism, we have to answer the question of what the effect of Stalinist dogmatism and leadership methods was on Soviet foreign policy. If we consult western sources, even in the work of George F. Kennan, this excellent diplomat and scholar, who by the way was United States ambassador in Moscow, we shall find passages like the following: "In the face of these frustrations, Stalin's last years were ones of increasing madness and sterility. His thoughts on foreign policy tended to the reliving of old situations".⁴

On the other hand several bourgeois historiographs come to conclusion defeating Kennan's opinion. The professor in charge of the Russian research centre of Harvard University, states that Soviet foreign policy, up to 1953, the year of Stalin's death, relied on the principle of peaceful coexistence. Among others he refers to a statement Stalin made to James Reston, of the New York Times, in December 1952, when he

pointed out the need for putting an end to the Korean war, and even spoke of a possible meeting with the newly elected President Eisenhower.⁵

On analyzing the international situation in the years following upon the War and the policy of the great powers the statement may be brought forward that as a matter of course the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and later on that of the young socialist countries, was of a defensive character: it served the preservation and the reinforcement of the positions of socialism. At the same time, as has been demonstrated by the documents of the international labour movement and also revealed by the proceedings of the XXth and XXIInd congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in matters of foreign affairs the period was not quite blameless.⁶

In the first place in the practice and methods of political work there were examples of a dogmatic attitude. Rigidity, the relative narrowing down of the elbow-room for manoeuvring, the use of an often insulting, and by no means convincing tone, the relative want of recourse to mutually beneficial compromises or the endeavour to establish personal contacts, all this hampered the unfolding of efficacious diplomatic work in the socialist countries. Notwithstanding these adverse symptoms the student of this period cannot be oblivious of the enormous difficulties amidst which Soviet diplomacy, and also that of the socialist countries had to transact their business in particular in the opening years of the 'fifties. Difficulties were particularly great in the relatively new field of multilateral diplomacy, viz. in the United Nations Organization, and within it, in the Security Council, where a policy tending towards the isolation of the socialist countries was even more manifest.

As regards UNO as a whole, the political preponderance of the imperialist states and the spirit of cold war made themselves felt in the following principal trends, till the beginning of the 'sixties, and in some of them, even to this date:

Frustration of the universality of the world organization by the exclusion of the People's Republic of China and a number of socialist countries, so as regards Hungary until 1955, and China, until 1971.

On the political plane direct confrontation in the various principal agencies of the UN, as was the case with the "financial crisis" emerged in the XIXth Session.

On the constitutional plane tendencies to curb the competence of the Security Council, to expand the functions of the General Assembly in a manner contrary to the Charter through the expropriation of the Secretariat, the specialized agencies and technical aid.

2. Collision of the two world systems as reflected by the proceedings of the Security Council

a) In 1946 the Iranian question opened the series of questions giving occasion to anti-Soviet representations. When in May 1946 the Soviet forces were withdrawn from Iran the discussion of the question was adjourned *sine die*. Negotiations in the Council between 1946 and 1949 in matters of disarmament purposing both the reduction of traditional armaments and the exploitation of subatomic energy for peaceful purposes, were abortive.

In 1950 the so far greatest political crisis of the United Nations broke out in connexion with Korean War. As the outcome of the Korean war many other questions were debated on in the Security Council, so the complaint of the People's Republic of China concerning the armed invasion of Taiwan by the United States forces. The complaint was discussed by the Council in August–November, 1950. At the same time the Soviet Union wanted to have the United States aggression against China taken up on the agenda as a separate item. In the summer of 1952 the United States moved the delegation of a committee of inquiry to carry through investigations in the question on "alleged bacteriological warfare", then on the agenda. This inquiry did, however, never take place.

In September 1954 a United States complaint was brought before the Security Council on an assault against American airplanes.

In 1955 New Zealand moved that the Security Council should inquire into the "armed conflict" between the People's Republic of China and the so-called Republic of China.

By the side of Asia Europe remained the principal area of confrontation.

As early as January 1946 on the motion of the Soviet Union the Security Council discussed the interference of British troops stationed in Greece in the domestic affairs of the country. In August 1946, on the motion of the Ukraine, the attitude of the Greek government to Albania was brought up for discussion. In December 1946 the Greek government charged the Northern neighbour of Greece with supporting the partisan movement. In 1947 there were a number of debates on Greece in the Security Council.

In March 1948 on the motion of Chile the so-called "Czechoslovak question" was brought up for discussion. The Soviet Union prevented a committee of inquiry from being sent to the country and the new Czechoslovak government declared that the motion of Chile was an interference in the domestic affairs of the country.

From September 1948 till May 1949 on the initiative of the United Kingdom, France and the United States the Security Council dealt with the Berlin question, or more explicitly the Berlin blockade, on several occasions.

In the series of matters indicating the confrontation of the two world systems the Hungarian question was the last, and perhaps the most remarkable. The Security Council debated on the "Hungarian question" in the wake of the counter-revolution between October 27 and November 5, 1956. Since attempts of an intervention were frustrated in the Security Council, the matter was brought up in the second extraordinary session of the General Assembly (It should be noted that the political analysis of the debates on the "Hungarian question" in the United Nations, also on grounds of international law, would require a special study.)

b) In addition to cases put on the agenda of the Security Council there was yet another question on which the two world systems were unable to agree, namely that of the election of the non-permanent members of the Council.

As one of the final products of the gradually withering positive effect of the cooperation of the great powers in the beginning an agreement was reached on the distribution of the non-permanent memberships on the Security Council. It was an unwritten agreement, a "gentlemen's agreement", as in general termed in professional literature. Accordingly of the six seats in the Council two were allotted to the Latin Americas, each a seat to Western and Eastern Europe, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Near East. At that time there was hardly an Afro-Asian state among the 51 states members, and even these few were members of the British Commonwealth.

No sooner the gentlemen's agreement began to operate than after the lapse of a year or two the Western powers and their allies infringed it, as a matter of course much to the prejudice of the eastern European group of countries. When at the end of 1974 the mandate of Poland, the first Eastern European non-permanent member, expired, the applicant Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic could hardly hold its own against the competing India. In the beginning of the 'fifties the Western European-Latin American voting machinery secured the seat reserved for Eastern Europe for Greece and Turkey. From 1955 onwards, when the Philippines and Japan occupied this seat, the situation became even worse. Later the system of divided membership became established to the prejudice of East-European countries. This was of course a violation of the Charter. It was in this period that even after ten to twenty votes none of the candidates could secure the statutory two thirds majority. Then one of the candidates generally withdrew with the promise to be given the seat in the following year. It was in this way that Poland shared the two-year's mandate with Turkey, Rumania with the Philippines, then Czechoslovakia with Malaysia.

The representative of the United States, in an arrogant manner, offered as an explanation for the discrimination to the prejudice of the socialist countries that the unwritten agreement was valid for the first election to the Security Council only, and that the East European governments do not contribute either to the peace or to the security. Therefore, in his view, they should not have any advantage over other states.⁷

The actual practice did not only ignore the legitimate claims of the socialist countries: in its then set-up the Security Council failed to meet the demands even of the Afro-Asian group. By 1963 of the 107 states members 57 belonged to the Afro-Asian group, (Taiwan and South Africa excluded) a number in excess of the total number of states members at the creation of the UN. The voices demanding the increase of the number of members of the Security Council, and so also of the Economic and Social Council, this other important agency of the UN, grew stronger and stronger. The number of seats could not be raised unless the Charter had been amended accordingly. In point of principle the Soviet Union and the socialist countries sponsored the demand of the Afro-Asian countries, but in view of the indispensable amendment of the Charter asked these countries for their patience. Since by Article 108 for the amendment of the Charter the ratification by the permanent members of the Security Council was needed, owing to the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the UN, the vote of Taiwan was to be ensured. It was feared that by this a dangerous precedent would have become established, as this was the first, and since then the most important case of an amendment of the Charter. The delegates of the socialist countries, among them also those of Hungary, in the Special Political Committee of the XVIIIth Session of the General Assembly emphasized that the proper course would be if in the matter of the increase of the number of members the Security Council decided in the presence of the People's Republic of China, or at least with her clear-cut consent. When on the question of the increase of the number of nonpermanent seats the delegations of the socialist countries voting in want of a clear-cut consent of China abstained the Chinese press laid to the charge of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries that they did not support the cause of the Afro-Asian countries. Notwithstanding this charge the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were the first to ratify the amendment of the Charter.

In accordance with the amendment the number of non-permanent seats on the Security Council has been raised from six to ten, and the number of votes required for a valid resolution from the earlier seven to nine. Drawing the lesson from the experiences with the "gentlemen's agreement" the General Assembly has taken the distribution of the seats in its hand. Accordingly five seats have been allotted to the African and Asian states, a seat to an Eastern European, each two seats to the Latin Americas and the Western European and other states (e.g. Canada, Australia, etc.). The position of the socialist countries has not improved in any noteworthy way, perhaps only in so far as their earlier seat is now firmly guaranteed.

c) The period of political conflicts and cold war problems did not come to an end for good in 1956. We refer to the complaint filed by the Soviet Union in the Security Council on account of the flight of US aircraft equipped with nuclear weapons over the territory of the Soviet Union. Although the United States interference into the domestic affairs of the Dominican Republic had not had its origin in the controversies

of the two world systems, there were nevertheless sharp clashes between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Security Council for practical purposes without a palpable result. The Security Council was turned into the scene of the revival of the cold war in August 1968 on the occasion of the Czechoslovak crisis.

However, from the closing years of the 'fifties and the opening years of the 'sixties onwards two processes and changes taking place in world politics began to manifest themselves also in the United Nations. The one was the shift of the balance of power of the two world systems in favour of the socialist countries, the other was the liquidation of the colonial system, the mass appearance of the countries newly become independent countries in the United Nations and their growing importance in world affairs. In the following section we shall deal with the new countries emerging from a colonial status in their relation to the Security Council.

3. The disintegration of the colonial system as reflected by the activities of the Security Council

From the very first days of the birth of the Security Council to the latest day there were continually items on the agenda standing for the landmarks in the history of the movements of national liberation and the liquidation of colonialism.

As early as on the 21st January, 1946, i.e. only four days after taking up its operation the Security Council, on the initiative of the Ukraine, put on the agenda the Indonesian question. It is worth while to mention that the Security Council rejected both the Ukrainian motion on the delegation of a fact-finding committee and the Egyptian motion to prohibit the use of British armed forces against the Indonesian forces of national liberation.

Between 1947 and 1949 the Security Council dealt on several occasions with the Indonesian question, and the debate and so also the resolution finally passed were instrumental in forcing the Netherlands to yield to realities and call off the colonial war. What was noteworthy was that hostilities ceased and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was born in the presence of the military observers of the UN.

When now the two great sets of problems as the outcome of the liquidation of colonialism indirectly responsible for permanent crises in the Near East and the Indian Sub-continent are for the time being ignored there still remain the following cases of major importance in the field under study:

In 1952 and 1953 the positions of the Western powers, in the first place of France, were still very strong in the Security Council to prevent the cases of Tunisia and Morocco from being put on the agenda. However, Algeria was on the agenda of the Security Council ever since 1955 until the recognition of her independence. Meanwhile again a complaint of Tunisia came up before the Security Council, namely that on account of

the bombing raid in the region of Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef. In 1961 the French aggression in the region of the naval base of Biserta had to be dealt with. Even if the debate in the Security Council failed to bring about a change in the course of French politics, indirectly, as noted also by American authors, it contributed to settlement of problems by way of negotiations⁸.

The Apartheid policy of the Republic of South Africa was first brought before the Security Council in 1960, after the General Assembly, since 1946, had Apartheid on the agenda on a number of occasions. It has remained on the agenda of the Council ever since. From the second half of the 'sixties onwards attention was focussed on South-West Africa (Namibia), together with the developments in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) merely because of the colonial régime maintained by the white minority with brutal force.

The Congo question became one of the outstanding issues not only of Africa, but of world politics as a whole. The question remained on the agenda of the Council from 1960 till 1964 until the liquidation of the ONUC.

From the second half of the 'sixties onwards we could witness the birth of a new phase. The problems associated with the liquidation of colonialism may be split up into two distinct sets. The one is that of Apartheid and the case of South West Africa (Namibia) closely associated with it and of Southern Rhodesia. All three matters virtually centre around racial discrimination and the violation of human rights rather than the maintenance of the classical system of colonization.

The second set of problems embraces those associated with the classical forms of colonialism, in the first place with the Portuguese colonies. Portugal, apart from suppressing her own colonies, constitutes a permanent threat to the neighbouring African states. This set of problems, includes, from the Stanleyville operation in 1964 onwards till the aggression against Guinea in 1970, all actions which have been launched with the conventional arms of intimidation and retaliation against the African states. In this connexion mention may be made of the armed actions in the Near East associated with the liquidation of the remnants of the British colonial empire rather than the Arab-Israeli conflict, thus e.g. the British bombing raids against Yemen, etc.

The questions on the agenda of the Security Council linked up with the liquidation of the one or the other form of colonialism allow of drawing the following conclusions:

The historical process of the disintegration of the colonial system was in the first place one which passed of outside of UNO. The outcome was determined by the power of the movements of liberation rather than by the resolutions of the UN (if the process could mature to the stage of resolution at all). Within the UN by the side of the Security Council in this process important functions were discharged also by the General Assembly and Trusteeship Council. In the questions under study the Security Council operated with low efficacy. As a matter of fact

the United Kingdom and France could first with a "hidden veto", later on with an open "against" vote prevent radical actions from being undertaken e.g. in Algeria or South Africa, or even Southern-Rhodesia.

Notwithstanding these symptoms retarding a wholesome process the statement may be made that with a few concrete measures, and the general political and moral weight of its debates the Security Council has also contributed to the gradual liquidation of the colonial system.

4. Appraisal of the Security Council and its prospects in the light of the opinion of the West and the Third World

In the preceding passages clearly loom up the overall picture of opinions and estimations of the Security Council and of suggestions for the course it should take. In the following we shall therefore refrain from an analysis of these opinions and estimations going into details. Instead we shall offer a schematic summary of the principal tendencies. As a preliminary we should like to call forth attention to three points. First, the opinions referred to may manifest themselves as official, governmental viewpoints, and also as scientific or political public opinion. Secondly, no clear-cut line can be drawn between opinions characteristic of the two groups of states. In particular as far as public opinion is concerned, here the two groups meet at several points. Thirdly, we have to underline that the term "third world" is inaccurate and cannot be considered a scientifically developed category. Nevertheless the term serves as an expedient indicating the group of states which in general may be described by two characteristics, viz. first, these countries do not belong to the military alliances of the Western or socialist countries, and, secondly, economically they may be considered developing states. Nor has the term "Western" to be accepted in the strictly geographical sense: even in the parlance of UNO the "West" includes, in addition to Western Europe, e.g. Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of South Africa, etc.

a. The western capitalist countries, in particular in the beginning of the 'fifties, were inclined so to say "write off" among their political potentialities the Security Council, and with all their efforts concentrated on the reinforcement of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In the United States, however, the most rightist and most conservative circles were dissatisfied even with the policy giving priority to the General Assembly. So among others a group of politicians headed by former President Hoover would have favoured the creation of a United Nations Organization without the Soviet Union, a suggestion against which even John Foster Dulles, on realistic considerations, had to take a stand.

Western, mainly American action was directed in the first place against the Soviet Union, on which the West wanted to lay the blame for the "paralysis" or deadlock in the Security Council. Even at that time the Western powers abstained from launching a direct attack against the principle of the unanimity of the great powers, i.e. against the veto, but reproached the Soviet Union for the "obstructive" recourse to the

veto, which it was alleged the Soviet Union made use of contrary to the agreement reached in San Francisco. When the Western powers sponsored the extension of the competence of the General Assembly they at the same time resorted to a rather interesting experiment: on the initiative among others of John Foster Dulles the idea was raised and debated on of the introduction of the system of "weighted voting", a system which as they thought would imply both guarantees and advantages for the, "West".

With the introduction of the system of weighted voting the principle of sovereign equality and one country — one vote implied in it would have been waived and the states members of the United Nations would by a variety of criteria assigned to a number of categories. The one opinion thought the number of population should be accepted as a criterion, whereas others would have given priority to the national income, and even to the general political and military weight of the country. According to a variant the Security Council, or by its proposed new designation, Executive Council, would have been composed of the representatives of the various categories of states. The veto would have been abolished, still voting would have organized so as to guarantee the majority of the countries of major importance⁹.

The system of weighted votes has lost any serious support. On grounds of principle the proposal met even before with the firm opposition of the socialist states. The countries of the „third world" stood up against the proposal partly on ground of principle, partly because the large number of small states included in this group would forfeit their actual significance in the General Assembly. Eventually after a thorough study the United States officially dropped the plan. A study of the Department of State, in 1963, with the aid of computers, in a number of variations demonstrated that in the event of the acceptance of anyone of the suggested criteria the weight of votes of small and medium countries in general in favour of the United States would drop. At the same time the United States too admitted that the system of weighted voting would defeat the principle of one state — one vote, and on considerations of principles it would be injurious to the interests of the United States to favour this system¹⁰.

Of the three western permanent members of the Security Council France is the one which for years already consistently takes the field for a Security Council operating in conformity with the Charter. Undoubtedly, in particular when Gaullist policy asserted itself with true vigour France was aware of the advantages the Security Council meant for the reinforcement of the remnants of her former *grandeur*. From the unfolding of the so-called financial crisis onwards and in particular in the XIXth session of the General Assembly, which passed off without a vote, even if on other grounds the French position in the matter of the preservation of the competence of the Security Council was essentially uniform with that of the socialist countries. In the Security Council France often acts as a friend and supporter of the small states, and occasionally pronounces

a moderate criticism on the United States, as was the case on the occasions of American aggression against the Dominican Republic.

The United Kingdom, although still sponsoring the idea of extending the competence of the General Assembly, was during the latter years often forced to have recourse to her own veto. Like France the United Kingdom, too, enjoys a special status owing to her permanent membership of the Council, at least in the United Nations, and therefore it is unlikely that she would move radical changes in the organization of UNO.

It appears as if the United States were reassessing her earlier point of view. To this the United States have been prompted by a number of reasons. Before all the outcome of the „financial crisis“ has taught the lesson that the socialist states cannot be isolated anymore, even in the General Assembly. Nor can every state be persuaded to accept the American interpretation of the Charter. Secondly, although on very rare occasions, the United States of America was outvoted, and it is not unlikely that in the future she would be forced to have recourse to the veto on many more occasions than before. Of late the American-Soviet negotiations outside UN, and in general the establishment of bilateral relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have considerably advanced cooperation between the two powers within the United Nations.

While the three Western powers have gradually waived their policy of a direct campaign against the Security Council, Japan has appeared on the scene with ideas of her own of a revision of the competence of the Security Council. Of the countries of the „third world“ we lay stress on Japan, because for her political alignment and her position in world economics Japan is tied rather to the group of „western and other countries.“ At the same time as a matter of course Japan tries to act also on behalf of the Afro-Asian countries within the United Nations. Thus Japan is the principal seconder of the motion brought forward in the XXVth Session of the General Assembly, and also subsequently, suggesting to make sure whether conditions as they are at present would permit the convention of a conference as foreseen by Article 109 for the revision of the Charter. Obviously what Japan in the first place expects from a revision of the Charter is that in the one way or the other she might secure for herself a permanent seat in the Security Council, what undoubtedly may be considered the symbol of her status of a great power. In this connexion the news item of the Hungarian Press Bureau from Tokyo dated May 4, 1972, deserves special attention:

„The Japanese foreign office has drawn up the outline of a revision of the Charter, which the foreign office wants to forward to Secretary-General Dr. Waldheim. The proposals are directed partly to limiting the veto of the permanent members of Security Council, partly to securing Japan's entry into the Security Council as permanent member. In the idea of Japan there should be no recourse to the veto when in the event of an armed conflict the United Nations contemplate the delegation of a fact-finding committee. According to Tokyo questions of international peace and security of outstanding importance should be discussed in the

General Assembly rather than in the Security Council. This would prevent the permanent members of the Council from making use of their veto. In Japanese opinion it is a mistaken policy that the nuclear powers should at the same time be permanent members of the Security Council. There should a seat be secured for Japan, as a non-nuclear power. To this end Japan is prepared to forgo the veto".¹¹

This news item of the Hungarian Press Bureau has been quoted here not merely to present an idea of the special endeavours of a state, viz. Japan, but also to allow an insight into the general feeling which unite a considerable part of the countries of the West the Third World as well as in their appraisal of the principal agencies of the UN. It should be noted that H. Kissinger after being nominated Secretary of State has also spoken in favour of Japan's permanent membership on the Council.

On speaking of the general feeling we cannot omit making mention of non-official, scientific-social opinions. There has a number of books and papers been published on the future of UN and within it of the Security Council and its functions. Here only three works will be quoted, which on the whole sum up the different ideas which have been brought forward. The one is the work of G. Clark — L. B. Sohn, whose title at the same time serves as the name of a prominent international association of lawyers. The second volume is in like way one published by American authors, Wilcox and Marcy, whereas the third work has a Frenchman as its author.¹²

The good intentions of the authors, who for that matter have collected private as well as official opinion (in particular Wilcox and Marcy) can't be called into doubt. It is beyond doubt, however, that a large portion of suggestions and proposals collected not only are unrealistic, but at the same time radically contradict the principles of international law and before all of the Charter of UN, in the first place the principle of sovereign equality. The much discussed and rejected idea of a „world government" looms up in many suggestions. For the purpose of the present study the following proposals and suggestions deserve special attention: abolition of the veto, the subordination of the Security Council to the General Assembly, submission of disputes of a legal character to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, which should be endowed with absolute jurisdiction, recourse to the International Court of Justice for the legal remedy of injurious resolutions of the Security Council, etc. etc. Although these unrealistic ideas have not disappeared altogether, still of late a more sober approach to the problems is making headway even in American literature. American authors are gradually becoming aware of the change in the power relations within the United Nations and also of the responsibility of the United States for the efficacy of the operations of UN.¹³

b. If now we consider the position taken by the countries of the „third world", or more precisely, of the non-aligned Afro-Asian countries, the following statements suggest themselves:

Even at the expense of the risk of exaggerated generalization it may be said that the states of the „third world” are most in need for the United Nations. As a matter of fact the states of the two world systems by relying on their political, economic and military potentialities may find the appropriate forms for the successful enforcement of their foreign political concepts even outside the United Nations. In want of such potentialities the countries of the „third world”, in particular the non-aligned countries, are making efforts to increase their political influence through the United Nations. In particular in the latter years these states are expecting aid from the United Nations before all for the liquidation of their economic backwardness. Still the expansion of the economic and development functions of the United Nations does not mean as if these countries were underrating the political functions. On the contrary, they are expecting dual political aid from the United Nations. First, in local or larger international crises these countries would prefer to apply to the United Nations for the restoration of peace rather than to anyone of the great powers or to the one or the other of the military systems. (Here it is not intended to pronounce a criticism of the position taken by these countries, merely its existence has been stated.) Secondly, they would like to make use of the United Nations for the liquidation of the remnants of colonialism and the suppression of the most revolting forms of racial discrimination.

The tenor of the critical remarks of the third world and its ideas developed in connexion with the United Nations follow from the character of this dual political task. The states of the third world would like to reinforce the United Nations, in the first place through strengthening the authority of General Assembly and through the limination of recourse to the veto in the Security Council. They would like to vest the resolutions of the General Assembly with binding force, and to provide a financial basis for future actions to be undertaken by the United Nations by ways and means not referred to in the Charter.

For reasons already known in the first question, i.e. the maintenance of peace, the countries of the „third world” before all come into conflict with the position taken by the socialist countries that actions for the maintenance of peace should be launched exclusively by a resolution of the Security Council. As regards the second question, i.e. the liquidation of colonialism, here the policy of the Western powers constitute the principal obstacle. Since in both instances the endeavours of the „third world” are frustrated by the principle of the unanimity of the powers, i.e. the veto, these countries are inclined, first, to consider the veto principal bar to progress, and, secondly, to believe that it is the veto that is responsible for the stereotyped confrontation of the great powers and the small countries.

It should be noted, however, that during the latter years the campaign against the veto among the countries of the “third world” has abated. One by one these countries begin to recognize that the unanimity rule of the great powers not only reflects the political realities of the world, but

at the same time safeguards their interests in the given instance. This change of opinion is particularly noticeable in the attitude of the Arab countries, still presumably India, too, will in the light of the crisis associated with the birth of the Republic of Bengal (Bangladesh) revise her earlier policy envisaging the increase of the competence of the General Assembly to the prejudice of the Security Council.

Hence the „third world” wants a more efficient United Nations and a more efficient Security Council. Experience little by little makes it clear to these countries that a modification of the present system as established by the Charter would not serve their interests. Yet we must not cherish illusions. The competence and organization of the Security Council, which we believe should remain as they are, will be exposed to criticism on the part of the „third world” for many years to come.

5. The balance of the activities of the Security Council and the place of the Council in the future system of collective security

On approaching the end of the present study we should like to sum up the positive and negative features of the activities of the Security Council *sine ira et studio*. At the same time we shall have to deal also with the prospects of the near future without, however, enlarging on „futurological” discussions.

For drawing any conclusions the following questions will have to be answered:

What has not been translated into reality of the ideas expressed or implied by the Charter regarding the Security Council?

How can the actual contributions of the Council, to the maintenance of international peace and security be summed up?

Have the ideas regarding the competence of the Security Council retained their validity, and if so to what extent?

Does the composition of the Security Council meet the exigencies of the changing world, with special regard to the permanent members?

Is the path to the establishment of a universal system of collective security open?

a. If we choose a pessimistic and even ironic reply to the first question, we should have to answer that practically nil has come true of the original ideas. After an objective analysis, however, the following may be stated:

The Security Council has not become the central agency of the system of collective security after the Second World War. This was the case not merely as if the pattern as shaped had not from the point of view of organization and principles been suitable for this responsibility. The Security Council has failed merely because no system of collective security has been created notably, for reasons already made clear. The Security Council has proved to be a failure not only because of the frustration of the unanimity of the great powers, but also because in the new situation cases of the infringement of peace and aggression wholly different from those predictable at the time of the creation of the Council have

manifested themselves. Instead of the forms and methods of Italian, German and Japanese aggressions eventually leading to the outbreak of the Second World War a period of local wars and of ideological political conflicts and clashes has followed. No actual breach of peace took place in Europe as presumed. Yet it was Europe where with the creation of NATO the rigid confrontation of military alliances had its origin. Thus, with very few exceptions the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter have remained a dead letter. The sanctions decreed against Southern Rhodesia constitute an exception which has been meant to liquidate the domestic oppressive rule of the white minority and not to put an end to the aggression of the one country against the other. The Security Council has failed to achieve any noteworthy results even in such an important field as disarmament.

On the „debit“ side of the balance sheet of the activities of the Security Council not only the entries representing unsolvable cases are distressing. For definite historical and political reasons the Council could not deal with the Viet-Nam conflict, or with the problems of Indochina in general. It was for the same reasons that the West Berlin question, and the German question as a whole could not be brought before the Council, and so the problems of European security, either. In many instances the Council had to content itself with the settlement of second-rate problems of international life.

b. If the actual achievements of the Security Council are placed in juxtaposition to the responsibilities of the Council as defined by the Charter, the balance struck will in fact be a meagre one. A small number of results may nevertheless be shown in the scope of Chapter VI, i.e. the peaceful settlement of disputes. Still at an appraisal of the activities of the Council not the number of cases solved definitively to the satisfaction of the parties concerned will be decisive. What is of even greater importance is the permanent forum the Council has provided for the presentation of conflicting opinions, complaints and mutual accusations. As the means of multilateral diplomacy, if in modest way only, the Council could contribute to the winding up of centres of international tension. This function of the Council was much in the fore when bilateral diplomatic relations froze almost completely, like at the time of the Korean war, and the attempts to settle it peacefully. This role of a lightning rod has been described aptly by Secretary General U Thant on speaking of UNO yet with reference to the Security Council: “Quite apart from its more positive functions, the United Nations provides an invaluable repository and a safe target for blame and criticism which might otherwise be directed elsewhere. The Organisation has, during all its years and in many situations, performed a vital function as an international lightning rod.”¹⁴

The Security Council has, however, contributed not only in general, but also in concrete cases to the maintenance of international peace and security. It had an undisputedly positive role in the advancement of the disintegration of the colonial system notwithstanding any adverse development. Within its peace-maintaining activities the Council has contri-

buted to the restoration of peace or at least to the localization of conflicts. These activities will speak for the Security Council even if certain traits in them are open to criticism. It may be stated, however, that this activity of the United Nations cannot be efficacious, and cannot be resorted to unless the direct confrontation of the two world systems and within them of the United States and the Soviet Union can be avoided.

c. It is beyond dispute that the principal goal the Charter, viz. to spare the future generation the horrors of war is still valid, moreover that it has grown in significance in the shadow of nuclear warfare. It is also beyond doubt that the achievement of this goal calls for the cooperation of the great powers as before and also for quick and efficacious action on behalf of the UN in conformity with Article 24. Thus the statement will hold that the cardinal provisions of the Charter have stood the test and that their possible nonenforcement can be accepted as a warning for their observance rather than an indication of their superfluity.¹⁵

The answer to the question will not, however, depend on whether or not the provisions of the Charter may be considered being timely. The gist of the problem is whether in union with the ideas of 1945 the Security Council will in fact become the forum of cooperation of the great powers, or will it be relegated to a secondary, auxiliary position by the side of the bi- and multilateral, and other extra-UN negotiations of the great powers. Let there be no mistake about it: for our part we are fully aware of that bilateral relations are still the primary form of international contact, and even approve of the practice. This has to be stressed even in the face of the progress the various forms of cooperation are making within the systems of alliances, or regional or universal international organizations. Incidentally this is a legitimate and positive process. It is also quite natural that even when recourse will oftener be had to the Security Council, decisions will more likely be made in the different capitals and not in the UN Headquarters in New York. What still remains a question is whether the particular states, in the first place the great powers with permanent seats in the Security Council will prefer to make use of the Security Council for the coordination of their policy and the enforcement of the decisions they might reach.

In our opinion, the various states, in particular the great powers, seem to be inclined to the belief as if under present circumstances the odds were more in favour of the settlement of problems of world policy outside UN, without recourse to the Security Council. We shall refrain from analyzing the causes of this development. We shall merely refer to the following points determining the situation: The special political, military and economic weight of the Soviet Union and the United States, and their primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace; the actual foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and her present relations to the Soviet Union; the fact that of the five permanent members of the Security Council there are at the same time members of NATO; etc.

We cannot, however, agree with those who want to represent the bilateral relations existing between the powers as being some sort of a

„conspiracy”, as suggested by the following quotation: „Now that the balance of power is changing, however, democratic control of foreign policy is waning. Multilateral diplomacy and the United Nations are being pushed aside and the emphasis now is on secret diplomacy at the meetings of the heads of great powers.” (New York Times, 1973. VI. 18.¹⁶) It should be remembered that the authority of UNO touched bottom when the great powers were confronting one another in a hostile spirit, whereas the drafting of the Charter and the creation of the United Nations were made possible exactly by the agreement of the „three great”, or the five great powers.

Hence we may answer the question we have put to ourselves by stating that the responsibilities and competences as defined by the Charter have remained in their totality as before, still the degree of efficiency will in the near future depend on the readiness with which those concerned will have direct recourse to the Security Council. We believe that this readiness will have to be even greater in the coming years, because the dialectics of exactly the circumstances referred to before will have to lead to the method of multilateral relations and negotiations, to settlements relying on compromises.

After this survey of the problems of a higher order we would comment on details of the problem of the competence of the Security Council as follows:

Frequent recourse to the application of Chapter VII of the Charter in its purity is unlikely in the near as well as distant future. Even on the assumption of the unanimity of the great powers it is not likely even in the event of a relatively „neutral” conflict, such as e.g. the armed clash of two African countries (see the case of Uganda and Tanzania) the Security Council would in conformity with Article 39 define the aggressor party and accordingly in conjunction with the General Staff Committee send UN troops to the site. It is by far more likely that in such and similar cases the United Nations will make use of the one or the other of actions destined to maintain peace, as a matter of course by virtue of a resolution of the Security Council. Thus a slow process making acceptable certain elements of the peace-keeping activities as a practical interpretation of the Charter cannot be precluded altogether.

d. As regards the composition of the Security Council the drafters of the Charter had in mind the then power relations of the world. Unlike the League of Nations, where membership of the Council lent a special status, in the United Nations a clear-cut line has been drawn between permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. By vesting the Soviet Union with the rights of the permanent members, the United Nations Organization has provided guarantees against making use of the Organization to the prejudice of the socialist countries, at least not without the violation of the Charter (see the Korean war). Thus the participation of the leading powers of the two world systems has become the *conditio sine qua non* of the survival of the Security Council.

As regards the institution of non-permanent membership it may be stated that the presence of non-permanent members is in agreement with the principle of sovereign equality. The non-permanent members, have not been allotted a subordinate role by the side of the permanent members: they take actively part in the formulation of the resolutions, in the consultations between the different groups of states. The number of members as increased since 1965 is more in agreement with the principle of an equitable geographical distribution of memberships, although the Eastern European, i.e. the socialist countries still have a single non-permanent seat only. The actual ten non-permanent seats, however, on the whole meet requirements, as the members elected to these seats in general also represent their regional groups. (Although nothing has been said of this representation in the Charter.) A further increase of the number of non-permanent seats is not advisable, first, because the Security Council would be too large, and, secondly, the ratio of membership would change to the prejudice of the permanent members. (For the non-permanent membership and within it for the activities of the Hungarian People's Republic in the Security Council see the study of the same author in *Magyar Jog*.)¹⁷

Problems of greater difficulty and complexity will crop up when it comes to speak of the permanent members of the Security Council. To begin with we may safely state that even in this connexion the Charter has proved to be durable. It may suffice to remember that the five permanent members are at the same time the powers possessing nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear armament is accepted as the common denominator of the five powers, it should be remembered that there are enormous differences in the degree of armament among the five powers. Among them the United States and the Soviet Union rise above the others with their strategic and economic resources. The position of the United Kingdom and France has become considerably weaker, although at the time of drafting the Charter both powers stood for the golden age of colonialism. We cannot, however, ignore two important factors. First, both the United Kingdom and France, beyond their actual and by no means negligible resources, have considerable influence in economics, commerce, trade, the scientific and cultural life, and in several other fields. Secondly, we have to remember the new situation brought about with the extension of the European Economic Community. It would be wrong to interpret the entry of the United Kingdom and of other countries as if by this a uniform, homogeneous Western European United States had been called to life. As a matter of fact even within the Community there will be for many years to come sovereign states of conflicting interests. It would not be proper, however, to make little of the process of integration, which will entail not only economic consequences, but whether we like it or not, also political consequences. In this meaning the claim of both the United Kingdom and France to a permanent seat in the Security Council has beyond doubt become stronger. In connexion with the permanent membership of the People's Republic of China we have already stated that

objectively this was inevitable and besides a positive event even when at present, and probably in the near future, China will continue to cause difficulties, be nuisance to the socialist states and in particular hamper the Soviet Union in unfolding her activities in the United Nations.

If the present status of the five permanent members is regarded as acceptable, the question may be asked whether it would not be timely to establish further permanent seats. The reply to the question will partially be defined by what we consider the criteria of permanent membership. As is known, neither the Charter, nor the San Francisco conference has given a clear-cut answer to this question. The only criterion, the one formulated in the Charter, is that the permanent member of the Security Council should be able to bear the responsibility conferred on it for the maintenance of international peace and security. In this there must, as a matter of course, be implied other criteria, such as the military and economic potential. Two further criteria should be taken into account. The one is the number of population, the other whether or not the member represents a definite region in both the geographical and political respects. These criteria should, however, be allotted a secondary role only by the side of those mentioned first.

What other countries may come into consideration as candidates for additional permanent seats in the Security Council should now be investigated in the light of what has been set forth before. In the first place Japan, India, or possibly Brazil and the German Federal Republic have been suggested for permanent seats. The names of Indonesia and Pakistan were also mentioned in the early 'sixties, however, under different historical circumstances.

Undoubtedly, Japan is the country which with its dynamic economic growth appears to satisfy best the criterion of economic potential. Similarly strong is the case of the German Federal Republic. On the other hand, both countries, and owing to provisions of her constitution in particular Japan, represent no adequate military power. Still dependent on possible political decisions both may rank among the strongest military powers before long. There is much in favour of India, before all that India has the second largest population in the world. Still as regards her national economy and military power India is lagging behind the countries mentioned before. The position of Brazil is very much the same. Brazil would be called rather to represent the "prestige" of Latin America in the Council, something she was striving for already in Dumbarton Oaks.

Still it is not only the want of the one or the other criterion which makes the invitation of anyone of these countries on the Security Council arguable. The reception of the one or the other of these countries in the Security Council would upset the balance partly between the present permanent members, partly between the countries likewise figuring as candidates for a permanent seat, yet by-passed. Furthermore we have to reckon with the contingency that the present permanent members, which would have to ratify the amendment of the Charter decreeing the increase of the number of permanent members, would exactly owing to

the change in power relations, refrain from doing so. Therefore all objective and subjective factors considered the creation of new permanent seats in the near future do appear neither feasible, nor desirable. In the last resort such an increase of the number of permanent members would be ill-advised, for the greatest achievement in the Security Council would be the bringing about of unanimity of the present permanent members. The reception of new members might hamper this process. The amendment of the Charter as a whole in a positive sense and together with it the resumption of the question of permanent membership at an appropriate moment should be made the task of a new historical period.

It should be noted that all that has been said is not intended to justify western ideas of a quinqu or multipole world. What is meant here is in complete unison with the statement that "... although in the international arena still the national states are the actors, an adequate idea of the international power relations and in particular of the trends in international life can be formulated only on the ground of the "system" approach, and in no case on that of the "power" approach".¹⁸

Hence by way of summing up we may state that on realistic considerations the Charter has left it to posterity to settle the problem how the structure of the Security Council may and can be changed so as to adapt it to changed conditions. This will, of course, be associated with a restatement of the provisions defining the functions and the competence of the Security Council.

e) The Security Council was unable to make use of the regional organizations to the extent allowed by Chapter VIII of the Charter. On the other hand, however, exactly in this connexion the question may be asked, whether it is not the creation of regional systems of security through which the path will lead to the effectuation of universal collective security? Putting this question is wholly justified, because exactly these days efforts are in full swing for bringing about security and cooperation on the European continent.

The ideas are well known of the times before the creation of the United Nations Organization suggesting the regional approach to the problem of security and the formation of a central corporate body of the great powers, which would have done business like some sort of a summit organization. Would this have been the proper course?

In our opinion the universal approach to collective security was the proper policy in the past, and has remained so at present. We should not be misled by the circumstance that in the period of the cold war the military and political systems created at that time rendered a relative stability, in contradistinction to the incapacity of the United Nations and within them the Security Council, and their withdrawal to the background. First of all the organizations called to life did not represent systems of regional security, but the military and political organizations of two conflicting world systems, and so do today. Secondly, the relative stability was maintained by the equilibrium of power, or as occasionally called in the West, the "balance of mutual fear", and not by some sort

of mutually isolated collective security of the different regions. We should remember that at the beginning of the slow and tiresome path leading to the creation of the European system of security, the states of the two social systems wanted to maintain and reinforce, respectively, the Warsaw Pact and NATO until European collective security has been brought about definitively. This is true and will remain so even when the Warsaw Pact from the very beginning has pledged itself to cease to exist automatically with the creation of European security.¹⁹

All that may be concluded from what has been said is, that the "systems" of universal and regional security cannot be pitted the one against the other. United Nations as the organ of collective security called to universality, cannot discharge this function until the cooperation of the two world systems has superseded military confrontation, on the principle of peaceful coexistence. Before this has been achieved, it would be futile to hope for the creation of regional security in either Europe or Asia in the presence of a world-wide military confrontation. This will, however, hold also the other way round, as by advancing regional security and cooperation we may contribute to the universal preservation of peace and security. On this consideration we cannot but admit the need for a slight modification of the original ideas of the Charter. The case is not one of a textual amendment: what is meant is a modification of the general approach to the problem of security. As a matter of fact the original idea was a system of completely centralized collective security, with the Security Council as axis. However, experiences of the past years have shown that collective security cannot be brought about, unless through the interaction of the complicated phenomena of world politics. The combined action of the political organizations and the regional agreements of the two world systems plus of the United Nations is needed in order that we might save "succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind."²⁰

In the system of collective security of the future, the Security Council will be unable to discharge this noble function alone, still it may become an important component of the success of the venture translating the dreams of mankind into reality.

NOTES

¹ *Fleming, D. F.*: The Cold War and Its Origins. New York, 1961. About the same position has been taken by: *Williams, W. A.*: The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. New York, 1962 and *Alperowitz, Gar.*: Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam. New York, 1962.

² *Schlesinger, Jr., Arthur*: Origins of the Cold War. Foreign Affairs, October 1967, p. 52.

"In retrospect, if it is impossible to see Cold War as a case of American Aggression and Russian response it is also hard to see it as a pure case of Russian Aggression and American response."

³ *Sulzberger, C. L.*: If Roosevelt Had Lived? International Herald Tribune, 13. 4. 1970.

- ⁴ Kennan, G. F.: Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin, New York, 1962.
- ⁵ Shulman, Marshall D.: Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. Harvard University Press, 1963. p. 262.
- ⁶ See among others: the speech of A. Mikoyan in the XXth Congress.
- ⁷ Green, T.: Gentlemen's Agreement and the Security Council. London, 1960, p. 26.
- ⁸ Kaplan, M. A. — Katzenbach, N. de B.: The Political Foundations of International Law, New York — London, 1961. pp. 293 — 294.
- ⁹ Clark, G. — Sohn, L. B.: World Peace through World Law. Second Ed. Harvard University Press 1962, pp. 80 — 82.
- ¹⁰ Weighted Voting Study, U.S. Department of State, June 2, 1963. Published by: Falk, R. A. — Mendlowitz, S. H.: The Strategy of World Order, 3. The United Nations, pp. 297 — 299.
- ¹¹ Bulletin of the Hungarian Press Bureau.
- ¹² Clark — Sohn: op. cit.: Wilcox, F. O. — Marcy, C. M.: Proposals for Changes in the United Nations Washington, 1955: Pancarci, V.: De la Charte des Nations Unies à une meilleure organisation du monde, Paris, 1962.
- ¹³ Alger, Ch. F.: The United States in the United Nations, International Organizations, Winter 1973. In particular pp. 16 — 19, 21 — 23.
- ¹⁴ Portfolio for Peace. Excerpts from the Writing and Speeches of U Thant. 1961 — 1968. New York, 1969. p. 35.
- ¹⁵ Cf. (Morozov — Shkunaev — Barsegov): (UNO, Results, Tendencies), Perspektivy, Moscow, 1970, p. 417.
- ¹⁶ See the article of Vladimir Dedijer in New York Times, 18th June, 1973.
- ¹⁷ Prandler, Árpád: A Biztonsági Tanács nem állandó tagjai a nemzetközi béke és biztonság szolgálatában (The non-permanent members of the Security Council in the service of international peace and security) Magyar Jog, 1968. No. 5.
- ¹⁸ Shakhnazarov, G.: Can there be talk of "power poles" in world politics (Hungarian translation) Béke és Szocializmus, 1972. No. 5 p. 119.
- ¹⁹ Article 11 of the Warsaw Pact declares: "... If the system of European collective security comes into being and to this end a treaty of general European collective security will be signed — what the Contracting Parties will constantly endeavour, the present Pact will on the day of the coming into force of the general European treaty forfeit its validity." Quotation from a collection of Treaties edited by Károly Lauko, p. 282.
- ²⁰ Preamble of the United Nations Charter.

РЕФЛЕКСИИ ПО ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ СОВЕТА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И ЕЕ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ

(РЕЗЮМЕ)

Настоящая статья отделена на следующие части:

1. Главным тормозом в реализации намеченных целей является отсутствие сотрудничества великих держав.
 2. Отражение столкновений двух мировых систем в Совете Безопасности.
 3. Отражение распада колониальной системы в деятельности Совета Безопасности.
 4. Оценка и перспективы Совета Безопасности в отражении мнений стран капитализма и третьего мира.
 5. Баланс деятельности Совета Безопасности и его место в системе коллективной безопасности будущего.
- В этой части статьи, автор ищет ответ на следующие вопросы:
- Какие из положений Устава, касающихся Совета Безопасности не были осуществлены?
 - В чем можно суммировать фактическое содействие поддержанию международного мира и безопасности?
 - Остались ли действующими положения компетенции Совета Безопасности и в чем?

- Соответствует ли нынешний состав Совета Безопасности требованиям непрерывно меняющегося мира, уделяя особое внимание постоянным членам Совета?
- Можно ли реализовать представления о создании универсальной коллективной безопасности?

RÉFLEXIONS SUR L'ACTIVITÉ DU CONSEIL DE SÉCURITÉ ET SES PERSPECTIVES

SUMMARY

L'étude se divise aux parties suivantes:

1. L'obstacle principal de la réalisation des objectifs désignés: la manque de la coopération parmi les grandes puissances.
2. Le reflet des conflits entre les deux systèmes mondiaux dans l'activité du Conseil de Sécurité.
3. Le reflet de la liquidation du système colonial dans l'activité du Conseil de Sécurité.
4. L'appréciation du Conseil de Sécurité et ses perspectives au miroir de l'opinion des pays occidentaux et du tiers monde.
5. La balance de l'activité du Conseil de Sécurité et son lieu dans le système de la sécurité de l'avenir.

Dans cette partie de l'étude, l'auteur cherche la réponse aux questions suivantes:

- Lesquelles des provisions de la Charte relatives au Conseil de Sécurité n'ont-elles pas été réalisées?
- Dans quoi peut-on résumer la contribution effective du Conseil au maintien de la paix et de la sécurité internationales?
- Les provisions relatives à la compétence du Conseil, ont-elles resté valides et comment?
- Est-ce-que la composition du Conseil de Sécurité correspond aux exigences du monde changeant, portant une attention particulière aux membres permanents?
- Est-ce-qu'on pourrait réaliser l'idée de la collective sécurité universelle?